REFORMING THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES: CHOOSING THE
MEASURING LIVES
ROBERT J. LYNN'*

[L]et the lives be never so many, there must be a survivor, and
so it is but the length of that life; [for Twisden used to say, the
candles were all lighted at once] .... 1

R EGENT perpetuities

legislation in England,2 New Zealand,3
and Western Australia4 has raised again questions about the
selection of measuring lives for the purpose of demonstrating the
validity of limitations in deeds, wills, and trusts under the Rule
Against Perpetuities. These new statutes are of more than purely
comparative interest: The measuring-lives problems encountered
under them are the same as those met under American legislation,
and English and commonwealth literatureu discussing the new statutes has included direct references to the perpetuities reform legislation adopted here in the United States.6
Selecting appropriate measuring lives for perpetuities purposes
has never been a matter free from difficulty, and it is absurd to
suggest that the adoption of a new version of the Rule Against
Perpetuities frees us to any appreciable extent from that difficulty.
But it is misleading to assert that it is too difficult to select measuring
B.S. 1942, J.D. 1948, Ohio State University; J.S.D. 1952, Yale University; Professor
of Law, Ohio State University; Visiting Professor of Law, University of California at
Los Angeles, 1965.
1 Scatterwood v. Edge, 1 Salk. 229, 91 Eng. Rep. 203 (K.B. 1699).
2 Perpetuities & Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
8 Perpetuities Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, No. 47 (N.Z.).
'Law Reform Act (Property, Perpetuities, and Succession), 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83
(W. Austl.).
5 Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. REv. 106 (1965); Allan,
The Rule Against Perpetuities Restated, 6 U.W. AusmT. ANN. L. REv. 27 (1963);
Leach, PerpetuitiesReform: London Proposes, Perth Disposes, 6 U.W. AUSTL. ANN. L.
REv. 11 (1963); Morris & Wade, PerpetuitiesReform at Last, 80 L.Q. Rzv. 486 (1964);
Simes, Reform of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Western Australia, 6 U.W. Ausm.
ANN. L. REv. 21 (1963).
The Kentucky statute has received particular treatment. See Allan, Perpetuitlies:
Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. REv. 106, 112-14 (1965); Allan, The Rule Against
PerpetuitiesRestated, 6 U.W. AusrL. ANN. L. Rav. 27, 45-46 (1963); Leach, supra note 5,
at 17 n.25; Morris & Wade, supra note 5, at 496, 498-99; Simes, supra note 5, at 24-25.
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lives under a "wait and see" version of the rule.7 Although that
assertion is made as a reason for retaining the orthodox rule, the
argument supporting the assertion is often overstated.8 Certainly
the assertion ought not to be decisive on the point, for it is demonstrable that selection of appropriate measuring lives in the more
common kinds of perpetuities cases is not too difficult under "wait
and see."
Nevertheless, the difficulties inherent in selecting the measuring
lives under reform legislation have already persuaded one jurisdiction to throw the problem back to the orthodox rule. The recent
Western Australian "wait and see" statute unhappily provides:
Nothing in this section makes any person a life in being for the
purpose of ascertaining the perpetuity period unless that person
would have been reckoned a life in being for that purpose if this
section had not been enacted. 10
In this article I propose (1) to review briefly the selection of
measuring lives for the purpose of demonstrating the validity of
limitations under the orthodox Rule Against Perpetuities, (2) to
demonstrate that the choice of measuring lives has been widened by
the new perpetuities statutes (including "wait and see,"' 11 "cy
7See Jones, Measuring Lives under the Pennsylvania Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 54, 64 (1960); Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsyl-.
vania PerpetuitiesLegislation, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 965, 976 (1959); Simes, Is the Rule
Against PerpetuitiesDoomed?, 52 MicH. L. REv. 179, 186 (1953).
8 See Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation: Hail, Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1124,
1142-47 (1960).
0 See Lynn, A Practical Guide to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DUKE L.J.
207, 219-23, 228-31, 237-39, 242-45.
10 Law Reform Act
(Property, Perpetuities, and Succession), 1962, 11 Eliz. 2,
No. 83, § 7 (3) (W. Austi.). Even the draftsman of the statute has admitted the weakness of this provision. See Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q.
REv. 106, 109-10 (1965). On the other hand, this approach has been called "fundamentally sound." Morris & Wade, supra note 5, at 499-501.
"The first example of a "wait and see" statute was that enacted by Pennsylvania
in 1947. It provides: "Upon the expiration of the period.allowed by the common
law rule against perpetuities as measured by actual rather than possible events
any interest not then vested and any interest in members of a class the membership of which is then subject to increase shall be void." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§301.4(b) (1950). The Pennsylvania statute has been discussed extensively. Brdgy,
A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities,23 TEMP. L.Q. 313 (1950); Cohan,
The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernels from Old Nutshells,
28 TEMP. L.Q. 321 (1955); Jones, supra note 7; Leach, PerpetuitiesLegislation: Hail,
Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. RIv. 1124 (1960); Mechem, supra note 7; Phipps, The
Pennsylvania Experiment in Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 20 (1949).
With the enactment of the Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55,
England joined Pennsylvania and those other jurisdictions having a full-scale "wait and
see" version of the rule. The English act has a limited "cy pres" feature. Perpetuities
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pres,"' 2 and "wait and see" coupled with "cy pres' '1 3 statutes), and
(3) to suggest a simple version of "wait and see" that leaves the selection of measuring lives where it can be most easily developed-in
the hands of the judges, lawyers and commentators 4 who shape the
rule from time to time.
I
THE MEASURING LivEs UNDER THE ORTHODOX RULE

The most frequently quoted statement of the common law Rule
Against Perpetuities in orthodox form is that of John Chipman
and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 4 (1). Other provisions of the English
act that have no counterparts in American legislation make the English statute more
comprehensive than any perpetuities statute recently enacted in the United States.
See generally Lynn, Perpetuities Reform: An Analysis of Developments in England
and the United States, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 508 (1965). The basic "wait and see" section
of the English act reads as follows: "Where . . . a disposition would be void on the
ground that the interest disposed of might not become vested until too remote a time,
the disposition shall be treated, until such time (if any) as it becomes established that
the vesting must occur, if at all, after the end of the perpetuity period, as if the
Perpetuities and
disposition were not subject to the rule against perpetuities .... .
Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 3 (1).
12 California, for example, reformed the rule by enacting a "cy pres" statute in
1963. It provides that:
"No interest in real or personal property is either void or voidable as in violation
of [the rule] ... if and to the extent that it can be reformed or construed within the
limits of [the rule] . . . to give effect to the general intent of the creator of the
interest whenever that general intent can be ascertained. This section shall be liberally
construed and applied to validate such interest to the fullest extent consistent with
such ascertained intent." CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 715.5 (Supp. 1964). California had
recently returned to the common law rule. See Recent Legislation, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
134 (1960). But this short-lived return was modified by the 1963 legislation, which
repealed §§ 693, 694, and 695 of the Civil Code (defining vested and contingent future
interests), and enacted §§ 715.5 (establishing "cy pres'), 715.6 (establishing a sixty
year period in gross), 715.7 (eliminating the "unborn widow" construction), and 715.8
(redefining a vested interest). CAL. Civ. CoDE ANN. (Supp. 1964). The constitutionality
and wisdom of § 715.8 have already been doubted. Review of 1963 Code Legislation,
38 CAL. S.B.J. 643 (1963); Comment, 16 STAN. L. REV. 177 (1963). The section was
intended to abrogate the rule of Haggerty v. City of Oakland, 161 Cal. App. 2d 407,
326 P.2d 957 (1958), but while the legislature was acting, the Supreme Court of
California was refusing to follow the rule of Haggerty in Wong v. Di Grazia, 60
Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817 (1963).
"Several states have combined the "wait and see" and "cy pres" principles. For
example, Kentucky's statute is as follows: "In determining whether an interest would
violate the rule against perpetuities the period of perpetuities shall be measured by
actual rather than possible events; provided, however, the period shall not be measured
by any lives whose continuance does not have a causal relationship to the vesting or
failure of the interest. Any interest that would violate said rule as thus modified shall
be reformed, within the limits of that rule, to approximate most closely the intention
See generally
of the creator of the interest." KY. REv. STAT. § 381.216 (1960).
DUKEEMINIER, PERPErUITIEs LAW IN ACTION: KENTUCKY CASE LAW AND THE 1960 REFORM
Acr (1962). Vermont has enacted a similar statute. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §501
(1959).
24 See Lynn & Carpenter, Applying the Rule Against Perpetuities to Class Gifts:
The Influence of Leach, 43 TEXAs L. REV. 37 (1964).

Vol. 1965: 720]

RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES

Gray: "No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."'1 Leach, who has tempered Gray's rule, 16 suggests that
this statement be preceded by the words "generally speaking," and
that the word "vest" be put in quotation marks.17 The rule invalidates an interest that might vest, if it vests at all, at a remote
time. A contingent future interest that might vest remotely, if it
vests at all, is said to be "bad" or "void" or "invalid" under the rule.
Although technically the rule is not concerned with interests so
created that they must vest, if they vest at all, within the perpetuities
period, it is conventional to say that a contingent future interest
that must vest, if it vests at all, within the permissible period is
"good" or "valid" under the rule. For example, if A, owning land
in fee simple absolute, grants "to B for life, remainder to C and his
heirs if C attains 35," and C is but twenty-one years of age at the
time of the grant, the remainder in C is contingent.' 8 The remainder in C is not invalid under the rule because it is so created
that it must vest, if it vests at all, within the lifetime of C, and C
is a "life in being" when the deed takes effect. Technically, then,
the rule does not apply. Stated conventionally, however, the contingent remainder is "good" or "valid" under the rule. By contrast,
if A grants "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first
attains 35," and B is a bachelor at the time of the grant, the contingent remainder is "bad" under the orthodox rule because it is not
so created that it must vest, if it vests at all, within the perpetuities
period.
Although it is sometimes said that any life can be used under
the orthodox rule as the "life in being" at the creation of the con(Emphasis added.)
'r GRAY, THE RULE AGAINsT PERPETu TEs 191 (4th ed. 1942).
Gray's statement has long been under attack: "Mr. Gray's statement of the Rule is
. . . inaccurate. It is the statement of an advocate, not of a judge." Sweet, The
Monstrous Regiment of the Rule Against Perpetuities, 18 Jum. REV. 132, 139 n. (a)

(1906).
20 See Lynn & Carpenter, supra note 14.
27 Leach, Perpetuitiesin a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. Rav. 638, 639 (1938).
18 The remainder in C is contingent at common law. In California the remainder
vests in C at its creation and is exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities because
of the following 1963 California legislation:
"An interest in real or personal property, legal or equitable, is vested if and when
there is a person in being who could convey or there are persons in being, irrespective
of the nature of their respective interests, who together could convey a fee simple
title thereto." CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 715.8 (Supp. 1964). A, B, and C could together
convey a fee simple. The wisdom of this section has been questioned, see note 12
supra, and its repeal demanded. Comment, 16 STAN. L. REv. 177, 190 (1963).
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tingent future interest to demonstrate its validity, 0 that statement
is accurate only in a limited sense and should always be read in
context. Most lives will be totally irrelevant to the disposition
and thus incapable of validating it (unless the draftsman provides a
reasonable number of these otherwise irrelevant lives in being to be
20
used for the express purpose of measuring the perpetuities period).
On the other hand, neither a life not even mentioned in the dispositive instrument nor a donee of a gift under the instrument may be
used to demonstrate validity. 21 In the ordinary case, then, one must
decide what "life in being" at the creation of the interest (if any)
is to be used to demonstrate the validity of a contingent future interest under the rule.
Here the non-specialist gets little help from acknowledged authorities in future interests, 22 and that is perhaps inevitable. Although the Rule Against Perpetuities did not attain its maturity
until about the time that Gray published the first edition of his
monumental work,23 it had been developing for more than two
hundred years prior to that time. Lawyers and judges had had
ample opportunity in a wide variety of perpetuities cases to illustrate
how one casts about in a particular case for a "life in being" at the
creation of the interest within whose lifetime (or within whose
lifetime and twenty-one years) the questioned interest must vest, if
it vests at all. Occasionally the facts are such that the twenty-one
year period in gross alone can be used to demonstrate validity. But
more commonly the process consists of choosing a life sufficiently
comparable to that chosen in like cases in the past that a judge will
concede the aptness of the life hit upon. Mechem admits the reliance we all place on learning by illustration when he says:
The question repeatedly asked is: how do you know which is the
What the Rule [in orthodox form] requires is

life in being? ...

1' "How do we determine the lives in being under the existing [orthodox] rule?
The answer is, we may use any life as the measure, provided we can say, at the time
the instrument takes effect, that, no matter what happens, the contingent interest
will not vest later than twenty-one years after the termination of that life." Simes,
Reforming the Common-Law Rule Against Perpetuities,in ABA PERPETUITY LEGISLATION HANDBOOK 42, 44 (2d ed. 1962).
20

There is no evidence that this practice is commonplace in the United States.
See generally 6 AMERcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.13 (Casner ed. 1952); 5 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 766(5) (1962); 3 Si Es & SITH, FUTUaR INTEREss § 1223 (2d ed. 1956).

op. cit. supra note 20, at § 766 (4); authorities cited note 20 supra.
See, e.g., authorities cited notes 20, 21 supra.

21 POwELL,
22
2s

GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETuITLs (1886).
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that the challenged estate must necessarily vest within 21 years after
the termination of some life either referred to or involved in the
limitation. What is meant by "involved" may be illustrated [by
example] ....
24
Having learned to give content to the expression "some life in
being at the creation of the interest" by studying the cases decided
by judges and expounded by commentators, how do we apply our
learning to the solution of a perpetuities problem? Suppose that
A devises "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains
35." Suppose further: that B was a woman thirty-five years of age
at the execution of the will and had a child or children alive at
that time; that further children were born to B before A's death;
and that B and one or more of her children are alive at A's death,
no child of B having yet attained thirty-five. B is sixty-five years of
age at A's death. The validity of the contingent remainder is questioned. If we construe "child of B" to mean "child of B alive at
A's death," the remainder is good under the rule because any child
of B alive at A's death will attain thirty-five, or not, within such
child's own lifetime. The remainder is demonstrably good although
we cannot identify the "life in being" with precision at A's death.
But suppose we give "child of B" the common construction "child
of B whenever born"? Human experience in the western world 25
tells us that B will not conceive a child after A's death, but human
experience includes information on the Rule Against Perpetuities
in orthodox form,, including the conclusive presumption of fertility.
The test for the validity of a contingent future interest under the

Rule Against Perpetuities in orthodox form is a possibilities test,
not an actualitiestest or a probabilitiestest. B might have a child
after A's death. Such after-born child of B might be the only child
of B to attain thirty-five, and he might attain that age more than
2 MECHEMt, CAsEs ON FUTURE INTRESTS 19 (1958). In this same connection, Professor Allan says, "From time to time, the perceptive student would ask 'But how do

you find the lives in being?' and would be dismissed with an answer such as 'Well,

they lust be mentioned either expressly or by necessary implication in the limitation
and they must not be too uncertain. Let's take a few examples and you'll soon get
the hang of it.'"

Allan, Perpetuities: Who Are the Lives in Being?, 81 L.Q. Rxv. 106-

07 (1965).
2 An all-Pakistani team of scientists is undertaking a study of the longevity of the
Hunzas of the western Himalayas. The team will try to discover why a Hunza woman
can give birth to a baby when she is more than sixty years of age and why a Hunza

man of ninety or more is virile enough to beget children. N.Y. Times, May 4, 1965,
p. 25, col. 1 (city ed.).
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twenty-one years after B's death. Therefore, the contingent remainder is bad ab initio under the rule in orthodox form although
the only children who could ever in fact qualify for the gift are
persons in being at A's death.
II
THE MEASURING LivEs UNDER "WAIT AND SEE"

"Wait and see" legislation allows an interest to be viewed in the
light of actual events, thus validating some gifts that would be invalid under the orthodox rule. Conversely, in some cases "wait and
see" permits a declaration of the invalidity of a contingent future
interest ab initio by rejecting the conclusive presumption of fertility that has made the rule in orthodox form the butt of law students' jokes for generations. Suppose that A devises "to B for life,
remainder to that child of B who first attains 35," and B is a bachelor
at A's death incapable of conceiving a child at and after A's death.
Under "wait and see" the inability of B to conceive is a fact20 that
justifies a declaration of the invalidity of the contingent remainder
27
at A's death.
Now suppose that A devises "to B for life, then to B's children
for their lives, remainder to the grandchildren of B." B was a
thirty-five-year-old woman at the execution of A's will, and had a
child or children at that time. Further children were born to B
before A's death, and B and one or more children and grandchildren
are alive at A's death. B is sixty-five years of age at A's death.
"Grandchildren" is construed to mean "grandchildren of B whenever and to whomever born." The gift clearly is bad under the
orthodox rule. Under "wait and see," may a court at A's death
declare the gift to the grandchildren valid ab initio? Valid because
the inability of B to conceive after A's death permits using the lives
of the children of B to demonstrate that the ultimate number of the
grandchildren who share in the gift will be fixed within "lives in
being" at A's death? If the conclusive presumption of fertility is
rejected in the case where the life tenant is a bachelor incapable of
conceiving a child at and after A's death, it should be rejected where
28

An "actual event" in the language of the Pennsylvania statute.

ANN.2 T tit. 20, § 301.4 (1950).

See PA. STAT.

Lynn, Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and See,"
and Cy Pres, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1391, 1397-1403 (1964).
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B is a woman sixty-five years of age at A's death. "Wait and see"
sets the time limit within which a contingent future interest must
vest, if at all, or fail under the Rule Against Perpetuities; "wait and
see" does not tell us when the declaration of invalidity is made. And
"wait and see" no more restricts us solely to declarations of the
invalidity of contingent future interests than does the rule in orthodox form. Most importantly, it opens up to us the use of measuring
lives to demonstrate the validity of limitations that traditionally
were not available to us when working under the rule in orthodox
form. In the preceding example, then, the gift to grandchildren is
"good" under "wait and see," and if "wait and see" is coupled with
"cy pres," no reformation of the gift is required.
Suppose that in the case just put, B is a woman forty years of
age at A's death, with a child or children and grandchildren then
alive. Suppose further that B is capable of conceiving a child at
and after A's death. If "grandchildren" is construed to mean "grandchildren of B whenever and to whomever born," the gift to grandchildren is bad ab initio under the rule in orthodox form. It is
bad ab initio because the validity of the gift to grandchildren
under the orthodox rule must be demonstrable as of the time of its
creation irrespective of when the perpetuities question is raised.
The lives of the children of B alive at A's death cannot be used
successfully to demonstrate the validity of the gift to the grandchildren because B might have a child after A's death, and such
after-born child might be the survivor of the children of B. Such
after-born child might in turn have a child more than twenty-one
years after B and all of the children of B alive at A's death have died.
The possibility that the ultimate number of grandchildren who share
in the gift might be fixed beyond the perpetuities period requires
invalidating the gift to the grandchildren in its entirety under the
orthodox rule.
Here "wait and see" relaxes the restrictions set on the choice
of measuring lives by the orthodox rule's requirement that a contingent future interest be so created that it must vest, if it vests at
all, within the perpetuities period. If B is a woman forty years
of age at A's death, and capable of conceiving a child at and after
A's death, the validity of the gift to grandchildren cannot be demonstrated at A's death. But "wait and see" requires no demonstration of the validity of a contingent future interest at its creation.
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Demonstration of validity may be deferred under "wait and see" to
a time beyond A's death. If all grandchildren of B are in fact born
within a period measured by the life of the survivor of B and the
children of B alive at A's death and twenty-one years, the gift to
grandchildren is good under "wait and see," and if "wait and see"
is coupled with "cy pres," no reformation of the gift is required. 28
III
THE MEASURING

LivEs UNDER "CY

PRES"

Like "wait and see," the "cy pres" version of the rule implicitly
rejects the conclusive presumption of fertility that is a characteristic
concomitant of the orthodox rule. If A devises "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains 35," and B is a bachelor
at A's death, incapable of conceiving a child, reformation of the
contingent remainder to read "remainder to that child of B who
first attains 21" would be futile because the gift would necessarily
fail by its own terms. If B and the successor in interest of A wish
to join in a sale of the land and marketability turns on securing a
declaration of invalidity, a court should declare the contingent
remainder bad under "cy pres." 29 Now assume the same limitations
with the following variation on the facts. B was a woman, thirtyfive years of age at the execution of the will, and had a child or
children at that time. Further children were born to B before A's
death, and B and one or more children are alive at A's death, no
child of B yet having attained thirty-five. B is sixty-five years of
age at A's death. May a court under "cy pres" refuse to reform the
contingent remainder 0 because the inability of B to conceive after
A's death permits using the lives of the children of B to demonstrate
that the remainder will vest, if at all, within lives in being at A's
death? If the conclusive presumption of fertility is rejected in the
28 Whether deferring the determination of validity of the contingent future interest
is a wise policy is not at issue here. For arguments that it is unvise, see Jones, supra
note 7, at 58-65; Mechem, Further Thoughts on the PennsylvaniaPerpetuitiesLegisla.
tion, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1959); Simes, Is the Rule Against PerpetuitiesDoomed?,
52 Mxcu. L. REv. 179, 184-90 (1953).
29 See Lynn, Raising the Perpetuities Question: Conception, Adoption, "Wait and
See," and Cy Pres, 17 VAND. L. Rav. 1391, 1403-04 (1964).

30 While the hypothetical case under discussion here can be differentiated from that
considered in note 18 supra and accompanying text, it still might be argued that under
§ 715.8 of CAL. Civ. CoDE ANN. (Supp. 1964) the remainder is vested and exempt from

the Rule Against Perpetuities. It is doubtless true that B, the children of B alive
at A's death, and the successor in interest of A could effectively convey a fee simple.
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one case, it should be rejected in the other. "Cy pres" tells us that
a contingent future interest, bad under the rule in orthodox form,
may be reformed. "Cy pres" does not tell us that reformation will
occur. In the example above no reformation of the remainder should
be made. If a child of B thereafter attains thirty-five, the remainder
should indefeasibly vest in him.
IV
THE MEASURING LIvEs IN ENGLAND
The choice of lives in being at the creation of the interest for
purposes of measuring the perpetuities period tends to be left open
in American legislation. 81 Perpetuities statutes in the United States
tend to be short and catholic in scope. For example, the Vermont
"wait and see" coupled with "cy pres" statute reads as follows:
Any interest in real or personal property which would violate the
rule against perpetuities shall be reformed, within the limits of
that rule, to approximate most closely the intention of the creator
of the interest. In determining whether an interest would violate
said rule and in reforming an interest the period of perpetuities
2
shall be measured by actual rather than possible events0
While the Kentucky "wait and see" coupled with "cy pres" statute
expressly deals with the problem of measuring lives, it does so only
in generalized language: ". . . provided, however, the [perpetuities]
period shall not be measured by any lives whose continuance does
not have a causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest."33
By contrast, sections 3 (4) and 3 (5) of the new English perpetuities reform act8 4 provide as follows:
(4) Where ["wait and see"] . . . applies to a disposition . . . the
duration of the perpetuity period . . . shall be determined as
follows:(a) where any persons falling within subsection (5) below are
individuals in being and ascertainable at the commence-'
"In New Hampshire the development of perpetuities law is relatively unrestricted,
because that state achieved its "wait and see" coupled with "cy pres" version of the
rule by judicial decision. Merchants Natl Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207
(1953); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 Atl. 900 (1891).
"VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1959).
83 Ky. STAT. ANN. § 381.216 (1960).
S Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
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ment of the perpetuity period the duration of the period
shall be determined by reference to their lives ....
(5) The said persons are as follows:(a) the person by whom the disposition was made;
(b)a person to whom or in whose favour the disposition was
made, that is to say(i) in the case of a disposition to a class of persons, any
member or potential member of the class;
(ii) in the case of an individual disposition to a person
taking only on certain conditions being satisfied, any person as to whom some of the conditions are satisfied and
the remainder may in time be satisfied;
(iii) in the case of a special power of appointment exercisable in favour of members of a class, any member or
potential member of the class;
(iv) in the case of a special power of appointment exercisable in favour of one person only, that person or,
where the object of the power is ascertainable only on certain conditions being satisfied, any person as to whom
some of the conditions are satisfied and the remainder may
in time be satisfied;
(v) in the case of any power, option or other right, the
person on whom the right is conferred;
(c) a person having a child or grandchild within subparagraphs (i) to (iv) of paragraph (b)above, or any of whose
children or grandchildren, if subsequently born, would by
virtue of his or her descent fall within those subparagraphs;
(d) any person on the failure or determination of whose prior
interest the disposition is limited to take effect.
It is apparent that under the Vermont or Kentucky statute, a court
has more freedom to shape the law than has an English judge working within the confines of the new English statute. For example, if
A grants "to B for life, remainder to that child of B who first attains
35," and B is a bachelor at the time of the grant, B is the "life
in being" in the United States for the purpose of measuring the
perpetuities period under a "wait and see" or under a "wait and
see" coupled with "cy pres" version of the rule. By contrast,
under the English statute both A 35 and B3 6 are "lives in being" for
the purpose of measuring the perpetuities period. Suppose B dies
survived by an only child twelve years of age, and by A. The validity
85 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 3 (5) (a).

80Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 3 (5) (c).
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of the gift to the child of B cannot be demonstrated at B's death,
but it is clear that the child of B cannot attain thirty-five within B's
lifetime and twenty-one years. Yet reformation in England must be
deferred. Three years thereafter A dies, survived by the child of B.

The child of B will attain thirty-five, or not, within A's lifetime and
twenty-one years, and under the English statute A is a life in being.
Reformation of the gift is unnecessary.
The provisions of the English act setting out measuring lives
have been subjected to sharp criticism. 37 They are undeniably
complex. But that very complexity demonstrates professional dissatisfaction with the restrictions set on the choice of measuring lives
under the rule in orthodox form. Such dissatisfaction is but a facet
of a general discontent with the orthodox rule, with its requirement
that a contingent future interest be so created that it must vest, if
it vests at all, within the perpetuities period. The niceties of the
English act are indeed annoying, and sections 3 (4) and 3 (5)3 should
not be used as a model by other jurisdictions undertaking reformation of the rule. But in its insistence on a greater latitude in the
selection of the measuring lives for the purpose of applying the
rule, the English statute reflects the accelerating movement for re
laxation of the requirements of the rule in whatever form it is
remolded. Considered in that light, the provisions of the statute
'7 Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L.Q. Rav. 486, 501-08 (1964):
"These subsections are of formidable complexity. They caused more difficulty in
drafting, and underwent more vicissitudes, than any other part of the Act ...

"A first criticism is that the statute has cast its net so widely in order to cover every

conceivable case that many quite inappropriate lives are included whose continuance
has no relevance to the' vesting whatsoever. The result is to extend the 'wait and
see' period beyond what anyone contemplated and beyond what wise policy would
seem to dictate....
"A second (and opposite) criticism is that relevant lives are sometimes excluded
and the 'wait and see" period unnecessarily restricted....
"A third criticism is that the statutory list applies not only to family transactions
but also to commercial transactions. But lives in being have no significance in commercial transactions....
"A fourth criticism is that if there are no ascertainable individuals under section
3 (5), the perpetuity period is twenty-one years only under section 3 (4) (b)....
"We believe . . . that [the approach of the Act] . . . to the problem of lives

in being is wrong and that its detailed provisions are faulty. But for most practical
purposes the provisions may still prove beneficial, and so justify the skill and care
with which they have been drawn."
38 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55.
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setting out measuring lives perform a worthwhile service, and the
shortcomings of these provisions are not intolerable.
CONCLUSION

The choice of measuring lives for the purpose of demonstrating
the validity of limitations under the Rule Against Perpetuities undeniably has been widened in those jurisdictions adopting a "wait
and see" or a "cy pres" version of the rule. In England and New
Zealand the expanded choice of measuring lives has been made
explicit.39 In such jurisdictions as California, Kentucky, New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Vermont, the expanded choice is
implicit.
The expanded choice of measuring lives originates in two sources:
First, the acceptance of a "wait and see" or a "cy pres" version
of the rule (or a combination of them) implicitly includes a rejection
of the conclusive presumption of fertility that was a characteristic
of the orthodox rule. In the English and commonwealth perpetuities reform statutes,40 that presumption is abandoned explicitly. This
abandonment of the conclusive presumption of fertility makes lives
relevant for the purpose of demonstrating validity that were necessarily disregarded under the orthodox rule.
Second, if at its creation neither the validity nor the invalidity
of a contingent future interest can be demonstrated under "wait
and see," determination of validity may be deferred, 41 and under
some circumstances, determination of validity may be deferred to a
time beyond the perpetuities period. 42 Abandoning the requirement of the orthodox rule that a contingent future interest be so
created that it must vest, if it vests at all, within the perpetuities
period, permits the use of lives for the purpose of demonstrating
validity that were necessarily disregarded under the orthodox rule
because the course of future events, viewed as of the time the interest was created, could not be predicted with certainty. If A
devises "to B for life, then to B's children for their lives, remainder
" Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §§ 3 (4), 3 (5);
petuities Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2, No. 47, §§ 8 (4), 8 (5) (N.Z.).
,0Perpetuities and Accumulations Act, 1964, 13 Eliz. 2,c.55, § 2; Perpetuities
1964, 13 Eliz. 2, No. 47, § 7 (N.Z.); Law Reform Act (Property, Perpetuities, and
cession), 1962, 11 Eliz. 2, No. 83, § 6 (W. AustL).
-see Lynn, A Practical Guide to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DuKE

207, 220.
42

See id, at 231 n.86.

Per-

Act,
SucL.J.
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to the grandchildren of B," and B is a woman forty years of age at
A's death, with a child or children and grandchildren then alive,
the ultimate number of grandchildren sharing in the gift to them
might be fixed within twenty-one years after the death of the survivor of B and the children of B alive at A's death. But the inability to postulate at A's death that the survivor of B and the
children of B will be drawn from B and the children of B alive
at A's death, precludes using the lives of the children of B alive at
A's death to demonstrate that the gift to grandchildren is good under
the orthodox rule.43 Under "wait and see," however, those lives may
be the ones ultimately used to demonstrate validity.
Examination of the new English and commonwealth perpetuities
legislation underscores a point that began to emerge when the
Pennsylvania perpetuities reform act was adopted in 1947: perpetuities reform statutes should be short, and cast in familiar terms. The
objective of the legislation having been set, be it adoption of "wait
and see" or "cy pres" or some combination of them, the statutory
language proposed for adoption should build on the structure created by Gray and should be as concise as possible consistent with
attaining the objective sought. Because it is exceptionally difficult
to draft perpetuities legislation that anticipates every twist and turn
of an admittedly abstract expression of public policy on dead-hand
control of wealth, filling in the detail of legislation should be left
to the courts.
Although Gray's statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities has
not been universally acclaimed, attempts to improve upon it have
not been particularly successful, and it is now an integral part of
our common law heritage. Whatever the rule might have become,
it was in flux when Gray wrote. If Powell is correct in his assertion
that Gray's conception of the rule is too narrow, 44 then Gray not
only made the rule a rule against remoteness of vesting but also
demonstrated most convincingly that sheer effrontery makes law,
45
for Gray's conception of the rule is generally accepted today.
"Of course the gift would be valid if "grandchildren" were not construed to mean
"grandchildren whenever and to whomever born."
"4"By [Gray's formulation of the rule] . - . the profession has been misled to
believe that the rule now concerns, and in the past did concern, only remoteness of
vesting." Powell, Nutshells and Perpetuities,7 U. CI. L. REv. 489, 492 (1940).
"5 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.3 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 SInms & SMITH, FuTuRE
INTERESTS § 1222 (2d ed. 1956).
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A simple form of "wait and see" is in substance a variation of
Gray's statement of the rule: "No interest in real or personal property is valid unless it vests, if at all, not later than twenty-one years
after some life in being at the creation of the interest." This statement of "wait and see" is subject to the criticisms leveled at Gray's
statement of the orthodox rule. But it avoids the use of unfamiliar
47
46
expressions such as "actual events" and "causal relationship."
It does what it is intended to do: It reforms the Rule Against Perpetuities in orthodox form. It does not cast lawyers and jurists into
a new and uncertain area where many errors will occur before the
law becomes well-defined.
If "cy pres" is to complement "wait and see," a single line can
be added: "An interest that violates the Rule Against Perpetuities
shall be reformed to give effect to the general intent of the creator
of the interest and to comply with the requirements of the Rule
Against Perpetuities."
Regardless of the precise formulation of the perpetuities reform
statutes, they should be read whenever possible as statements of policy
and should be stretched to their limits in order to achieve sensible
results. It is doubtless true that the more abstruse principles of
property law will continue to be used by a relatively small segment
of our total population, that they will continue to constitute "rich
men's law," and that they will evoke little general interest. Even so,
they ought to work well. The degree of freedom accorded to
judges by the rules of construction and by the intricacies of the
Rule Against Perpetuities itself, is unquestionably great; but unless
we are to pay no more than lip service to the relative freedom of
disposition which our society permits, we should not use the Rule
Against Perpetuities as a substitute for legislation which gives a
forced share of a decedent's estate to the natural objects of his
bounty. The rule is ill-designed for accomplishing anything more
than its primary task.
Even if we could demonstrate conclusively that Gray's view of
the rule (as a rule only against remoteness of vesting) is a misconception, we cannot undo three-quarters of a century of legal learning. The best we can do is to build upon what we have. The
perpetuities reform statutes are a beginning.
"See
7

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.4 (b) (1950).

' Ky. REV. STAT.

§ 381.216 (1960).

